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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Delay discounting is a concept that has developed in behavioral economic 
research during the past few decades.  It has typically been viewed as a behavioral 
measure of impulsivity and specifically measures individual choice as a function of 
choosing a smaller, immediate reward or a larger, delayed reward.  Research in this area 
has indicated that substance abusers discount delayed rewards at a much higher rate than 
non-substance abusers (e.g., Petry, 2001; Richards, Zhang, Mitchell & de Witt, 1999; 
Vuchinich & Simpson, 1998).   Thus far, the cause of this difference has been unclear.  
Correlational research has pointed to such variables as impulsivity (e.g., Vuchinich & 
Simpson, 1998), introversion-extroversion (Ostaszewski, 1996, 1997), level of sociability 
(Collins, Vincent, Sorraco, & Lovallo, 2005) and cognitive factors such as executive 
functioning (Barkley et al., 2001) and working memory (Hinson et al., 2003).     
Previous research regarding family history of substance use has shown that 
children whose parents have substance use disorders are more likely than controls to 
develop substance use problems of their own (Cloninger, Bohman & Sigvardssou, 1981; 
Cotton, 1979; Kapiro et al., 1987).  However, when researchers have accounted for the 
children’s level of sociability (So) as well as family history of substance use, they have 
found that children who have high sociability do not seem to be affected the same as 
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children with low sociability (Werner, 1986).  Specifically, children who were higher in 
sociability and had a family history of substance use disorder (FH+) were relatively free 
of personal problems, while the children who were low in sociability were not.  The 
consequence of this finding may be that sociability is more strongly associated with 
future substance abuse and delay discounting than is family history.  Recently, this 
hypothesis was supported in research conducted by Collins et al. (2005). 
Collins et al. (2005) conducted a study of 192 non-drug-dependent young adults 
in an attempt to assess possible differences in delay discounting as a function of family 
history (FH) and sociability.  The results of the study suggest that FH alone is not 
significantly related to delay discounting, but sociability was significantly related to 
discounting.   
In addition to the above developments, Hinson, Jameson and Whitney (2003) 
demonstrated that delay discounting is modifiable.  By adding a third choice to a delay 
discounting task, and thereby increasing cognitive load, participants discounted delayed 
rewards at a higher rate than when there were only two choices.  That is, the study 
suggests that delay discounting may be affected by increased cognitive burden. 
 As a result of these developments in the literature, the present study will attempt 
to define a relationship between sociability, family history of substance abuse, increased 
cognitive load and delay discounting. Furthermore, we will attempt to replicate the 
Collins et al. (2005) study and try to determine whether sociability is more strongly 
related to discounting than is a positive family history of a substance use disorder.  
Finally, we will investigate whether individuals who differ with regard to level of 
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sociability are differentially affected by increased cognitive burden by adding a three-
choice delay discounting task. 
Delay discounting research may have important practical implications in the 
assessment and treatment of substance use disorders.  Specifically, since groups of 
individuals with substance use disorders discount delayed rewards more steeply than 
controls, it may be possible that assessment based on behavioral discounting measures 
may be able to predict who is at risk and who is most likely to benefit from interventions.  
Additionally, delay discounting may possibly be used to assess if substance abuse 
treatment worked.  That is, previous research has shown that ex-smokers discount 
delayed rewards in a fashion that is similar to matched, never-before smokers (Bickel et 
al., 1999).  This evidence may indicate that discounting might be related to the effects of 
abstinence.  Although the evidence is encouraging and the possibilities of delay 
discounting research are exciting, much more research is needed in this area. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 The following sections will provide a review of the delay discounting literature, 
further explanation of the goals and hypotheses of the present study, along with a detailed 
description of the proposed studies procedure of measurement and a method to analyze 
those measures. 
Delay Discounting 
The degree to which the value of a reinforcer is influenced by time delay is 
known as delay discounting (Ainslie, 1992; Myerson & Green, 1996). The prototypical 
example of delay discounting is when an individual must choose between a smaller 
reward available sooner and a larger reward available later.  A real world illustration of 
this type of choice is when an individual decides to either use heroin and receive the 
immediate reward of the drug’s effect, or to not use and receive the larger reward of 
reducing harmful behavior that could lead to future problems (e.g., familial, social, 
academic, health). 
 Delay discounting research has demonstrated that, when adding the dimension of 
time delay to reward size in choice task, a preference reversal occurs (Bickel & Madden, 
1999; Green et al., 1981; Green, Fristoe, & Myerson, 1994; Green et al., 1997; Kirby & 
Herrnstein, 1995; Loewenstein & Elster, 1992; Mazur, 1987).  The preference reversal 
phenomenon is when an individual reverses their decision from a large, delayed reward to 
a smaller, immediate reward.  More specifically, an individual chooses the larger reward 
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available later when both that reward and the more immediate, smaller reward are 
available far into the future; however, with the passage of time the preference becomes 
reversed and the individual chooses the more immediate, smaller reward (Green & 
Myerson, 2004; Green, Myerson, & McFadden 1997).  For example, an individual may 
prefer to receive $500 immediately as opposed to $550 dollars in 2 months, however, 
when asked if they would prefer $500 in one year or $550 in 1 year and 2 months, 
individuals may be more inclined to choose the larger, later reward.  Preference reversals, 
according to discounting theory, occur because over time the subjective value of the 
smaller, more immediate reward increases more quickly than the subjective value of the 
larger, later reward when there is an equivalent decrease in the delays associated with 
each of the two rewards (Green & Myerson, 2004).  Taken from another point of view, 
preference reversals occur due to the subjective value of the larger, later reward 
decreasing more slowly when its acquisition is more delayed, as compared to the 
subjective value of the smaller, more immediate reward. 
 This preference-reversal phenomenon has provided insight into the development 
of a discounting function.  This function is hyperbolic and attempts to relate the 
subjective value of the reward to the time it is received (Green, Fristoe, & Myerson, 
1994).  This hyperbolic function is expressed in the following equation (Mazur, 1987): 
V = A/(1 + kD) 
Where V is the subjective value of the delayed reward, A is the amount of the delayed 
reward, D is the delay to its receipt, and k is the parameter that governs the rate at which 
the value declines with time.  Collins et al. (2005) explain that k is best conceptualized as 
an indifference point where the individual finds the immediate value equal to the delay 
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value.  Smaller values of k are indicative of slower rates of discounting, while larger 
values of k represent faster rates of discounting.  Thus, individuals with large values of k 
quickly devalue delayed rewards and have a very small immediate indifference point 
(Collins et al., 2005). The hyperbolic function has been demonstrated in many empirical 
studies (e.g., Ainsle, 1992; Kirby, 1997; Kirby & Marakovic, 1995; Kirby & 
Santiesteban, 2003; Green, Myerson, & McFadden, 1997; Mazur, 1987; Rachlin et al., 
1991; Raineri & Rachlin, 1993; Simpson & Vuchinich, 2000).   
 The rate at which an individual discounts an outcome (i.e., the k value) can be 
determined by using methods of psychophysical scaling (Baker, Johnson, & Bickel, 
2003).  During this procedure, an individual is presented with a fixed outcome option and 
an immediate outcome option that is adjusted until the individual finds the two options 
equivalent in value.  For example, an individual may be presented with a choice between 
$150 paid after three months and smaller amount of money paid today (e.g.,$10).  The 
magnitude of the immediate reward is then adjusted from $10 until the individual reaches 
a point of indifference between the two options (e.g., indifferent between $150 in three 
months and $100 today).  The individuals then estimate the value of the $150 paid after 
other delays as well (e.g., six months, one year, or ten years).  Finally, the rate which the 
value of the $150 is delay discounted is estimated by fitting hyperbolic function to the 
indifference points obtained for each of the delays (Baker, Johnson, & Bickel, 2003). 
Factors that Influence Delay Discounting 
 Two types of factors influence delay discounting.  First, there are factors that deal 
with the particular reward itself (Level I Factors), such as the domain of the reward, the 
sign of the reward (receipt of outcomes that constitute a gain versus a loss), the 
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magnitude of the reward, and the length of delay preceding receipt of the reward.  
Secondly, there are factors that involve the individual themselves (Level II Factors), such 
as the age of the individual, their income, culture, personality traits, abuse or non-abuse 
of a substance, and executive functioning.  All of these factors have been tested against 
delay discounting in order to see what influences they may have.  Typically, Level I 
Factors are studied while varying individuals Level II Factors (e.g., Madden, Bickel & 
Jacobs, 1999; Madden et al., 1997; Odum, Madden, Badger & Bickel, 2000).  This cross-
comparison of factors will follow after a brief explanation of each factor and how it can 
solely influence delay discounting. 
Level I Factors.  Baker, Johnson, and Bickel (2003) describe that the domain 
effect refers to the rate at which a reward is discounted depends on the commodity being 
considered.  Early research studying the domain effect first compared discounting rates 
for hypothetical monetary gains, vacations, and health gains (Chapman & Johnson, 
1995).   Researchers found that health gains are typically discounted at a higher rate than 
vacations and monetary gains and that monetary gains and vacations did not differ in 
their delay discount rate.  However, Chapman and Johnson’s (1995) research does not 
take into account the sign effect, which is another factor that has an effect on delay 
discounting.   
 The sign effect refers to the observation that  outcomes that constitute a gain are 
delay discounted at a higher rate than outcomes that constitute a loss (Baker, Johnson & 
Bickel, 2003).  For example, Cairns (1992) found that individuals will discount 
hypothetical monetary losses at a higher rate than hypothetical health losses.  This result 
demonstrates the sign effect, whereby changing the sign of the reward will change the 
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rate of discounting of that reward.  That is, individuals who typically value monetary 
gains over health gains switch to valuing their health more than money when incurring a 
loss.  Studies have also found that individuals tend to discount hypothetical money gains 
at a steeper rate than hypothetical money losses and discount health gains at a steeper rate 
than health losses (Baker, Johnson & Bickel, 2003; Benzion, Rapoport & Yagil, 1989; 
Loewenstein, 1988; Shelley, 1993; Thaler, 1981; for health discounting, Chapman, 1996; 
MacKeigan et al., 1993). 
 In addition to the domain and sign effect, delay discounting is also influenced by 
what is called the magnitude effect.  This effect refers to the finding that individuals will 
discount smaller delayed gains at a higher rate than larger delayed gains, or taken from 
another point of view, individuals will typically discount smaller delayed losses at a 
higher rate than larger delayed losses. For example, an individual will typically choose a 
$500,000 reward available in one year as opposed to a $100,000 reward available now 
and choose a $5 reward now over $25 in one year.  Although the proportion of the two 
rewards for the two scenarios are equal, individuals will typically discount the larger 
reward less when it becomes too large to not choose it.  The magnitude effect has been 
demonstrated in numerous studies regarding hypothetical and real monetary rewards 
(Benzion, Rapoport & Yagil, 1989; Green, Fristoe & Myerson, 1994; Green, Fry & 
Myerson, 1994; Green, Myerson, & McFadden, 1997; Johnson & Bickel, 2002; Kirby, 
1997; Kirby & Markovic, 1996; Myerson & Green, 1995; Raineri & Rachlin, 1993; 
Thaler, 1981).  Furthermore, it has been shown to hold up in regards to vacations and 
hypothetical health outcomes (Chapman, 1996; Chapman & Johnson, 1995; Raineri & 
Rachlin, 1993).  It should further be noted that Green, Myerson and McFadden (1997), in 
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an attempt to replicate the magnitude effect in a delay discounting paradigm, found that 
the discounting rate decreased in a “negatively accelerated fashion” as the amount of the 
delayed, hypothetical monetary reward increased from $100 to $25,000.  A leveling 
effect, however, was also produced when the reward increased beyond $25,000, up to 
$100,000. 
 The length of delay until the receipt of the reward has also been shown to 
influence delay discounting (Green, Fristoe, & Myerson, 1994; Green, Myerson, & 
McFadden, 1997; Ostaszewski, 1996; Richards, Zhang, Mitchell & deWitt, 1999; 
Vuchinich & Simpson, 1998).  Typically, the longer the delay to the reward the steeper it 
will be discounted.  It can be inferred from Vuchinich and Simpson’s (1998) study that a 
reward that is delayed for 300 months (25 years) reduces in its subjective value by 50% 
to 90%.  The influence of length of delay is illustrated in the state lottery, that is, 
typically, individuals choose to take the smaller, immediate sum of money instead of the 
larger sum of money spread out over 30 years.   
 In sum, the domain effect, the sign effect, the magnitude effect, and the length of 
delay are all types of level one factors that influence delay discounting, and, therefore, 
should be controlled so as to not provide a confound in discounting research. 
Level II Factors.  The first individual factor that has demonstrated influence on 
delay discounting is the age of the individual.  Mischel, Shoda and Rodriguez (1989) 
reported that with an increase in age came an increase in the ability to delay gratification.  
Therefore, discounting researchers hypothesized that if this ability to delay gratification 
increases throughout the life span, then older adults would be expected to discount 
delayed rewards at a lower rate than children or young adults (Green, Fry & Myerson, 
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1994).  Green, Fry and Myerson (1994) also hypothesized that it could be possible that 
with increasing age individuals may have a fear of not surviving until the receipt of the 
delayed reward, and, therefore, this could lead to greater delay discounting rates in older 
adults.  The results of the study showed that older individuals discounted delayed rewards 
at a slower rate than younger individuals.  
 In a follow-up, Green et al. (1996) examined income and its influence on delay 
discounting of older adults and younger adults.  The study looked at a higher 
socioeconomic status (SES), younger adult group (Mage = 33.3 years; Mincome = $50,000 
per year), a higher SES, older adult group (Mage = 70.7 years; Mincome = $50,000 per year) 
and a lower SES, older adult group (Mage = 70.8 years; Mincome= $10,000 per year).  The 
results of the study showed that adults of different ages, but of similar SES levels, tended 
to discount delayed rewards at a similar rate; however, individuals of similar age and 
different SES levels tend to discount delayed rewards differently.  Specifically, SES and 
rate of discounting appear to be inversely related.  Green et al. (1996) seems to contrast 
their earlier study (Green, Fry, & Myerson, 1994) which showed the rate of delayed 
discounting systematically decreased from childhood to old age.  The researchers suggest 
that income may be a more important variable than age in decision making. 
 Furthermore, Green et al. (1996) research uncovered an interesting effect of 
income on delay discounting.  The reason that it is interesting is that one might assume 
that the subjective value of the same monetary amount would be greater for a poorer 
person as opposed to a richer person.  Furthermore, given that larger delayed amounts are 
discounted less steeply than smaller amounts (i.e. the magnitude effect), it should follow 
that the poorer person would discount the delayed monetary reward less steeply.  
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However, Green et al. (1996) results propose that this is not the case, that the opposite 
will occur, even when the level of education is held similar across groups (Green & 
Myerson, 2004). 
 The third individual factor has been demonstrated to influence delay discounting 
is the culture of the individual making the choice.  In the seminal research conducted by 
Du, Green and Myerson (2002), researchers found that among American, Chinese and 
Japanese individuals, American and Chinese individuals discounted the delayed reward at 
a steeper rate than the Japanese.  Furthermore, since all three groups discounting data fit 
the hyperbolic line the best, it suggests that individuals are qualitatively similar cross-
culturally in how they discount. 
In addition to age, income, and culture influencing delay discounting behavior, 
there has been a recent accumulation of research demonstrating that substance abusers 
typically delay discount at a higher rate than non-abusers.  Individuals included under the 
title of substance abusers include alcoholics, heavy social drinkers, cigarette smokers, 
opiod-dependent individuals, and marijuana and cocaine users.  Research has also 
demonstrated that compulsive gamblers discount delayed rewards at a higher rate than 
non-gamblers.  Typically there is a high rate of substance abuse in this group.  Petry and 
Casarella (1999) reported that not only did substance abusing individuals delay discount 
at a higher rate than non-substance abusing controls, but also that substance abusing 
problem gamblers discount delayed rewards at an even faster rate than non-gambling 
substance abusers.  Green and Myerson (2004) point to the possibility that there is likely 
to be an additive effect with regard to group membership and delay discounting.  That is, 
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the more comorbid addictive behaviors an individual demonstrates, the more likely they 
are to discount delayed rewards at a steeper rate. 
 Several studies have pointed to a relationship between higher rates of discounting 
and cigarette smokers (Baker, Johnson & Bickel, 2003; Bickel, Odum & Madden, 1999; 
Mitchell, 1999; Reynolds, Richards, Horn & Karraker, 2004).  One interpretation of this 
finding is that individuals who are more likely to discount delayed rewards (health) and 
choose the immediate reward (satisfaction of smoking), may be more prone to choose the 
activity of smoking, where this type of discounting occurs daily.  It could also be the case 
that cigarette smoking itself could lead to these increased discounting rates, not that 
individuals who choose smoking tend to be steeper “discounters” a priori.  The only 
evidence that suggests cigarette smoking leads to increased discounting rates is that ex-
smokers discount in a fashion similar to matched non-smokers (Bickel et al., 1999).  
Myerson and Green (2004) point out that it is important to keep in mind that although 
group-specific experiences may be a cause of group differences in delay discounting, it is 
also quite possible that individual differences in discounting help to determine group 
membership (i.e. being a substance abuser).   
In addition to the comparison of discounting in smokers and gamblers, researchers 
have reported that alcoholics/heavy drinkers (Petry, 2001; Richards, Zhang, Mitchell & 
de Witt, 1999; Vuchinich & Simpson, 1998) and opiod-dependent individuals (Kirby, 
Petry & Bickel, 1999; Madden, Petry, Badger & Bickel, 1997) delay discount at steeper 
rates than non-substance-abusing controls.  Furthermore, Petry (2001) reported that 
alcoholics discounted hypothetical alcohol rewards, of equal monetary value, at a faster 
rate than hypothetical monetary rewards.  Likewise, Madden, Petry, Badger & Bickel 
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(1997) found the same effect, with regard to hypothetical heroine rewards and 
hypothetical monetary rewards.  It was also reported that individuals who discounted 
hypothetical money rewards at a steeper rate tended to discount heroine rewards at a 
steeper rate.  Green and Myerson (2004) make an important point regarding this effect of 
abused substances being discounted more steeply than money when they state: 
“Not only may substance abusers differ from non-abusers in terms of 
discounting, but in addition, those who tend to show less self-control may, 
as a result, engage in behavior involving rewards that, by their nature, tend 
to undermine self-control, thereby exacerbating the problem.”  (p. 784) 
 
 Ostaszewski (1996) investigated a fifth factor, personality traits.  The study 
attempted to determine whether there is a relation between the rate of delay discounting 
and temperament, specifically, sensation seeking, introversion-extroversion, and 
impulsivity.  The results of this study suggested that the rate of discounting was 
equivalent for both high and low sensation seekers.  However, extroverts and individuals 
who were highly impulsive delay discounted at a faster rate than introverts and low 
impulsive individuals, respectively.  It should be noted that in a follow-up to this study 
Ostaszewski (1997) replicated these results.  Ostaszewski (1996) hypothesizes two 
possible reasons that extroverts have a higher rate of discounting: (a) extroverts may have 
differences in time perception compared to introverts, and (b) extroverts may have a 
greater susceptibility to rewards (Eysenck & Gudjonsson, 1989).  Extroverts typically 
view the passage of time more slowly than introverts do (Lynn, 1961; Wudel, 1979), and, 
therefore, extroverts would be expected to discount at a faster rate because the given 
amount of time would seem to be longer.  In addition, the researchers posit that for 
extroverts an immediate reward may be a stronger incentive than it is for an introvert.   
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These results of discounting and introversion-extroversion should not be taken too 
strongly; there was only a small significant difference between the two groups when the 
delayed reward was of a larger sum ($1,000) and the difference has not shown to occur 
for smaller delayed rewards ($100).  On the other hand, level of impulsivity has shown to 
be a decent predictor of delay discounting, however, it typically only accounts for, at 
most, 24% of the variance (Alessi & Petry, 2003; Hinson et al., 2003; Kirby, Petry & 
Bickel, 1999; Mitchell, 1999; Petry, 2002; Vuchinich & Simpson, 1998).  Furthermore, in 
four studies (Bickel, Odum & Madden, 1999; Crean, de Wit & Richards, 2000; Reynolds, 
Richards, Horn & Karraker, 2004; Richards, Zhang, Mitchell & de Wit, 1999) no 
significant correlation was found between delay discounting and impulsivity.  Other 
personality traits, such as sociability, may be a better predictor of delay discounting and 
will be a focus of the present study.  Pilot research on sociability, as measured by the 
Socialization (So) scale of the California Psychological Inventory (CPI; Gough, 1987), 
and its relationship with delay discounting has shown that decreased sociability was 
associated with higher rates of discounting (Collins et al., 2005). 
Effects of Family History, Sociability and Cognitive Load on Delay Discounting 
 Family history has been viewed as important to the understanding of substance 
abuse.  Ehlers (1995) found that (FH+) individuals are two to four times as likely to 
develop alcohol dependence as individuals without a family history of alcoholism (FH-).  
Researchers have also demonstrated that children whose parents have other substance 
abuse symptoms or who have suffered from severe substance use disorders are more 
likely than controls to develop substance abuse problems of their own (Cloninger, 
Bohman & Sigvardssou, 1981; Cotton, 1979; Kapiro et al., 1987).  In addition, Sher et al. 
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(1991) and Blum and Kozlowski (1990) found FH+ college students to score higher in 
impulsivity and risk taking measures than FH- peers.  FH+ college students when 
compared to their FH- peers have also been found to show a lack of normal positive 
affect (Blum & Kozlowski, 1990).  Though family history seems to be an important 
indicator of future substance use, recent findings (e.g., Collins et al., 2005; Werner, 1986) 
in the area of sociability has led researchers to question whether family history and 
sociability together predict future problem substance use better than family history alone.   
Sociability, as measured by the So scale of the CPI, can be generically defined as 
an individual’s compliance, or lack thereof, with societal norms.  Gough (1994), with a 
more comprehensive definition, contended that the So scale serves as an indicator of the 
extent an individual has internalized prosocial values, systems of control, and other 
adaptive mechanisms necessary for norm-observing behavior. 
 The So Scale has shown to be predictive of rule abiding versus rule-breaking 
behavior.  Moreover, a clinical range cut-off score of 30 has been established where 
groups with a mean above thirty appear to have no clinically significant problems with 
socialization, while those groups with a mean below 30 have at least some difficulty in 
socialization (Gough, 1994).   It is important to point out that the So scale cut-off score 
appears to be quite reliable and valid.  Out of 104 groups studied there have been no 
groups with low-socialization attributes with a mean above 30 on the So scale (Gough, 
1994).  It is also important to note that among less-socialized groups there seems to be an 
additive effect.  For example, Forgac and Michaels (1982) found that a group of male 
exhibitionists with no prior record of criminal behavior had a So mean of 29.05, while a 
group of male exhibitionists with a prior history of crime had a So mean of 24.70.  Mayer 
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and Ligman (1989) results demonstrated another example of this additive effect when 
they compared groups of college students who were non-users of marijuana, occasional 
users of marijuana, and those who were heavy users, with So means of 31.16, 26.90 and 
22.08, respectively. 
Other studies using the So scale, such as Searles and Alterman (1994), compared 
sons whose fathers had one or two symptoms of alcoholism to those whose fathers had 
three or more symptoms.  The groups’ respective So means were 27.42 and 25.07.  
Werner (1986) studied high school students in Hawaii whose fathers and/or mothers had 
serious problems with drinking alcohol when the student was between the ages of two 
and ten years old.  Werner (1986) assessed and classified the students into two groups: 
one group comprised of those showing serious personal problems and the other group 
containing individuals who were relatively free of such personal problems.  The So scale 
mean for the group of students with serious problems was 25.27, while for the group 
relatively free of such personal problems it was 29.93.  
As a result of studies such as Searles and Alterman (1994) and Werner (1986), 
new questions have emerged.  Does family history of substance abuse or sociability have 
an independent, additive, or interactional relationship with temporal choice making (i.e., 
delay discounting)?  Does an individual’s family history coupled with their degree of 
sociability provide a stronger association with temporal choice making and the possible 
development of future problems?  If the latter question were supported, it would 
strengthen the position of a diathesis-stress model for explaining neurobehavioral 
function.  That is, if an individual is family history positive for substance abuse, it may 
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also be necessary for them to be low in sociability to consider them to be truly at risk for 
future problems. 
Collins et al. (2005) initiated exploratory research into whether sociability 
combined with family history is more strongly associated with decision making, as 
measured by delay discounting task, and substance use, than either family history or 
sociability alone.  The results lend support for a main effect of sociability and not family 
history as being primarily associated with decision making.  That is to say, individuals 
who were high in sociability, with or without a family history of substance abuse, 
discounted at a significantly lower rate than those individuals who were low in 
sociability.  Also, there was no interaction between sociability and family history. When 
groups were combined across both FH and sociability, thus creating four groups (i.e., FH-
/High So, FH-/Low So, FH+/High So, and FH+/Low So), Collins et al. (2005) found that 
FH+, low sociability individuals discounted delayed rewards significantly more than 
FH+, high sociability individuals.  It is also noteworthy to mention that the Collins et al. 
(2005) study used a highly selected sample of individuals who did not suffer from 
substance use problems or other types of psychopathology.   The present study will partly 
serve to replicate Collins et al. (2005) in an effort to see if the same results can be 
demonstrated with a less selective sample.  Collins et al. (2005) suggests that since they 
used such a selective sample a relationship between FH and delay discounting may have 
been masked. 
A recent study (Hinson et al., 2003) demonstrated that delay discounting scores 
are modifiable.  Based on previous research suggesting a connection between working 
memory and impulse control problems (Finn, Justus, Mazas, & Steinmetz, 1999), the 
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researchers looked at the possibility that increased cognitive burden would be associated 
with an increase in rate of discounting delayed rewards.  Specifically, they investigated 
“intrinsic” and “extrinsic” cognitive load manipulations of working memory and the 
relation to impulsive decision making.  Impulsive decision making was measured by both 
a delay discounting measure and a standardized measure of impulsiveness (Barratt 
Impulsiveness Scale; BIS).  An “extrinsic” cognitive load was created by having the 
participants try to retain, in memory, a string of numbers (e.g., 25341) during the delay 
discounting task and recall that information following completion of the discounting task 
(e.g., “What was the number to the right of 5?”).  It has been demonstrated in a variety of 
studies that creating a cognitive load by requiring a participant to maintain a digit string 
in memory while performing another task does not merely occupy a verbal buffer but 
actually occupies attentional resources allocated by the executive component of working 
memory (Baddeley, Chincotta & Adlam, 2001; Toms et al., 1993).   The “intrinsic” load 
was increased by increasing the number of options to be evaluated on the discounting 
task.  Hinson et al. (2003) reported that an increase in “extrinisc” or “intrinsic” cognitive 
load leads to an increase in discounting of the delayed, hypothetical monetary reward.  
That is, by systematically increasing the amount of the cognitive load by either giving the 
participant more digits to remember or by giving them more choices on the discounting 
task, there was a direct increase in the rate of discounting the delayed monetary reward.  
Further, a strong relationship was found between standardized, self-report measures of 
impulsiveness (Barrett Impulsiveness Scale; BIS), executive dysfunction (Dysexecutive 
Questionnaire; DEX), and delay discounting.  Therefore, the research suggests that both 
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“extrinsic” and “intrinsic” factors that increase cognitive burden, should be predictive of 
a more impulsive decision-making style (Hinson et al., 2003).   
 Along with the possibility that both sociability and family history of substance 
abuse, either separately or together, are more strongly associated with discounting rates, 
it will also be important to investigate if cognitive burden, as produced by a cognitive 
load, leaves low sociability individuals more susceptible to higher rates of discounting 
compared to individuals who are higher in sociability.  That is, will low sociability 
individuals be more affected by cognitive burden and, therefore, even less likely to 
choose the delayed reward compared to high sociability individuals in the same 
condition? 
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CHAPTER III 
PRESENT STUDY 
 The purpose of the present study was to investigate the relationship between 
sociability, family history of substance abuse, increased cognitive load and delay 
discounting.  First, the association between family history of substance abuse, sociability 
and delay discounting was examined.  Previous research indicates that individuals with a 
positive family history of a substance use disorder are at increased risk for substance use 
disorders of their own.  Likewise, sociability, as measured by the So Scale, appears 
linked to increased risk with scores below 30 indicative of higher risk.  Also, individuals 
with substance use disorders have greater delay discounting functions than non-substance 
use disorder controls.  Furthermore, in a recent study, Collins et al. (2005) reported that 
for a non-substance use disorder sample, delay discounting was significantly greater for 
individuals with low So Scores, while family history did not differentiate participants 
delay discounting scores.  Thus, it was expected in the present study that these findings 
would be replicated and extended to a larger sample.  Delay discounting scores were 
predicted to show significant differences between high and low sociability groups 
independent of family history.   
Second, it was investigated whether an increased cognitive burden through the use 
of a cognitive load would affect discounting rate.  Previous studies demonstrate that by 
systematically increasing cognitive burden, researchers are able to directly increase 
discounting rates.  Based on this research, it was expected that increased cognitive burden 
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would be associated with significantly higher discounting rates regardless of sociability 
and family history.  Third, we examined whether groups who differ with regard to level 
of sociability were differentially affected by increased cognitive burden.  It was predicted 
that the low So group’s discounting rates would increase significantly more when 
compared to the high So group’s discounting rates. 
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CHAPTER IV 
METHOD 
Participants 
 Participants (N = 251; 188 females) were undergraduate students attending 
Oklahoma State University, ranging in age from 18 to 62 years (M = 20.4).  The sample 
was 73% Caucasion, 9% Native American, 4% African American, 2% Asian American, 
1% Hispanic American, 6% Other, and 5% did not report race or ethnicity.  Participant’s 
data were excluded from certain analyses involving family history comparisons if they 
did not meet the criteria necessary for FH+ or FH- for substance use disorders (see 
exclusion criteria below).  All participants were enrolled in an undergraduate psychology 
course during their participation in the study, received extra-credit for participation, and 
were recruited through the Oklahoma State University Psychology Department’s research 
subject pool, which is operated using Experimetrix internet-based software.  Experimetrix 
requires that participants register for each experiment, thus stopping them from 
participating in the study more than once.  Also, participants’ IP addresses and month and 
date of birth were stored along with their data, allowing researchers to delete duplicated 
cases (if participants hit the “submit” button more than once). 
Measures & Procedure 
 The study was conducted on the internet.  Participants connected to the study’s 
URL address (http://fp.okstate.edu/collinslab/ted/) where they completed the measures at 
their convenience.  Gender, age, ethnicity, and questions regarding history of 
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neurological issues and mental health treatment were assessed before completion of any 
of the following questionnaires occurred.  The study was approved by the Oklahoma 
State University Institutional Review Board (see Appendix C). 
 Family history of alcoholism and other drug problems.  Family history 
categorization was be determined using the Family History Research Diagnostic Criteria 
(FH-RDC; Andreasen, Endicott, Sitzer, & Winokur, 1977).  The FH-RDC is a 109-item,  
self-report questionnaire and items are answered either “yes” or “no.”  The FH-RDC has 
a high degree of inter-rater reliability (α = .95) for reports of substance use disorders 
(Zimmerman, Coryell, Pfohl, & Stangl, 1988; Andreasen, Endicott, Sitzer, & Winokur, 
1977).  Participants were considered FH+ if biological father or biological mother were 
described as having/had a substance use problem, and considered FH- if none of the 
biological parents or grandparents were described as having/had substance use problems. 
 Assessment of alcohol related problems.  Current alcohol consumption was 
assessed using the Brief Young Adult Alcohol Consequences Questionnaire (B-YAACQ; 
Kahler, Strong, & Read, 2005).  The B-YAACQ is a 24-item measure in which the 
participant is presented questions in a dichotomous response format, covering: (1) social-
interpersonal consequences, (2) impaired control, (3) self-perception, (4) self-care, (5) 
risk behaviors, (6) academic occupational consequences, (7) excessive drinking, and (8) 
physiological dependence.  The B-YAACQ has shown very high internal consistency 
with a Cronbach’s α of 0.83 (Kahler et al., 2005).  In the present study, the α also 
indicated a very good internal consistency of 0.92.  The measure also has strong 
convergent validity with other reliable and valid measures, such as the Rutgers Alcohol 
Problem Index (RAPI; White & Labouvie, 1989, r = .78).  The B-YAACQ is sensitive 
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for differing levels of severity and has been controlled for effects of gender (Kahler et al., 
2005).  
 Assessment of Sociability.  The Sociability scale of the California Psychological 
Inventory (So-CPI; Gough, 1987) was administered to assess participants’ conformity to 
societal norms.  In the CPI normative sample of 1,000 persons of each sex, the 46-item 
So scale had a correlation of 0.98 with the previous 54-item, 1957 version for each sex 
(Gough, 1994).  Internal consistency was quite strong in the present study with a 
Cronbach’s α of 0.78.  Based on 69 studies, Gough (1994) indicates that for men scores 
of 32 and above are indicative of above average rectitude and conformity to societal 
norms, scores of 30-31 are indicative of ordinary normative compliance, and scores 29 
and below are indicative of problems conforming to societal norms.  Based on 41 studies, 
Gough (1994) indicated that for women scores of 33 and above are indicative of above 
average rectitude and conformity, scores of 32-30 are indicative of ordinary normative 
compliance, and scores of 29 and below are indicative of problems conforming to societal 
norms.   
 Delay Discounting.  Delay discounting was assessed using the questionnaire 
developed by Kirby, Petry and Bickel (1999).  This 27-item questionnaire presents 
hypothetical monetary choices between a smaller, more immediate choice and a larger 
delayed choice.  The indifference points for each choice were created to represent 9 
different discounting rates (k) ranging from 0.00016 to 0.25 with three items associated 
with each of the nine rates (Collins et al., 2005).  For instance, one item is a choice 
between “$14 today” and “$25 in 19 days.”  Considering these factors, a k of 0.041 is 
associated with an indifference (i.e., the participant finds each choice to be of equal 
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value) to these two choices.  If the participant chooses the immediate reward of “$14 
today,” it will be assumed that he/she has a k greater than 0.041.  However, if the 
participant chooses the delayed reward of “$25 in 19 days,” it will be assumed that he/she 
has a k less than 0.041.  The geometric mean between the rates where the participant 
chooses the immediate rewards and the rates where they choose the delayed rewards 
served as the individual participant’s rate. 
 In addition to the two-choice delay discounting questionnaire, a three-choice 
delay discounting questionnaire was administered.  This questionnaire has the same 
properties as the two-choice version and the same scoring criteria, with the exception of 
the third choice.  For example, one item is a choice between “$14 today,” “$25 in 19 
days” or “$36 in 38 days.”  This three-choice item still has a k of 0.041 associated with 
the indifference point.  As prescribed by the previous discounting research (e.g., Collins 
et al., 2005), for both the two and three-choice discounting questionnaires, participants 
were excluded if they always chose the immediate or delayed reward. 
 Adaptation of the L and F scales from the MMPI-2.  In an attempt to exclude 
participants who were faking answers or who were randomly answering items, the 
present study included adapted items from the L and F scales of the MMPI-2 (J. 
Callahan, personal communication, August 8, 2005).  This is a six-item questionnaire 
with three questions form each scale.  An answer of “no” on any of the L scale items may 
indicate that the participant is trying to describe himself/herself in an unrealistic positive 
manner, while an answer of “yes” on any of the F scale items may indicate that the 
person is trying to describe himself/herself in an unrealistic negative manner.  
Participant’s data was excluded from analyses if they endorsed either all three of the L 
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scale or F scale items.  These scales were presented at the beginning and at the end of the 
study in order to help determine if participants were being consistent across the 
administration.  
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CHAPTER V 
RESULTS 
Preliminary Analyses 
Correlation Matrixes.  See Table 1 for a comprehensive correlation matrix of 
interest to the present study.  Regarding the L and F scales from the MMPI, no participant 
endorsed all three of the L or F scale items; therefore, no data was excluded from 
analyses because of these two scales.  However, Pearson correlations indicated that the L 
scale scores were significantly associated with scores on the So scale [r = .300,  p(2-
tailed) = .001] and the B-YAACQ [r = -.176, p(2-tailed) = .017], indicating that 
participants who scored higher on sociability and participants who had fewer negative 
drinking behaviors were more likely to describe themselves in an unrealistically positive 
manner.  F scale scores were also significantly correlated with So scores [r = -.173, p(2-
tailed) = .018] and the B-YAACQ [r = .204, p(2-tailed) = .005] indicating that describing 
oneself in an unrealistically negative manner was significantly associated with lower 
sociability scores and more negative drinking behaviors.  A Pearson correlation was 
conducted on the two L and F scales presented in the study in attempt to determine if 
participants were consistent across the administration.  The correlations of the two 
measures was strongly associated [r = .913, p(2-tailed) = .001] indicating that it should be 
assumed that a large majority of the participants answered consistently.  Family history of 
substance use and So scores were also significantly correlated [r = -.435, p(2-tailed) = 
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.001] with high So scores associated with participants who were FH-.  Two-choice and 
three-choice delay discounting k scores were significantly correlated with B-YAACQ 
scores [r = .184, p(2-tailed) = .012 and r = .189, p(2-tailed) = .01, respectively]. Finally, 
So scores and B-YAACQ scores were significantly correlated [r = -.379, p(2-tailed) = 
.001]. 
Alcohol problems, FH, and Sociability.  Analyses of the B-YAACQ indicated that 
the current sample’s mean (M = 4.9) was much lower than the mean (M = 8.6) that seen 
in the college sample used when designing the measure.  A mean of 5 indicates, 
according to Kahler et al (2005), that the individuals in this group have a 79% chance of 
having done or said something embarrassing while drinking, a 23% chance of having 
done something impulsive when drinking that they regret, and only a 6% chance of 
reporting that drinking has harmed the quality of their work or schoolwork.  Further, 
while Kahler et al. (2005) found it to be very rare (0.9% of the sample) for participants to 
not endorse any symptoms of consequences of alcohol use, in the present study, the 
modal number of symptoms endorsed was 0 (28.2% of the sample). 
 Additionally, analyses indicated that there was no significant difference between 
the FH- [M = 4.6 (5.8)] or FH+ [M = 5.0 (5.4)] group with regard to B-YAACQ scores 
[t(84) = .298, p(2-tailed) = .767].  However, there was a significant difference between 
the low sociability group [M = 7.8 (6.5)] and the high sociability group [M = 3.6 (4.4)], 
with the high sociability group having fewer problems with alcohol than the low 
sociability group [t(175) = 4.945, p(2-tailed) = .001, d = .82] 
Determination of FH Status.  Based on criteria for determination of FH+ and FH- 
affiliation (i.e., FH+ if either biological parent have/had problems with substance use, 
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FH- if none of the biological parents or grandparents have/had problems with substance 
use), 165 participants were excluded from the preliminary and primary analyses 
involving FH.  The FH+ group (n = 46) and FH- group (n = 40) significantly differed on 
sociability scores as measured by the CPI [t(84) = 4.42, p(2-tailed) = .001], whereby the 
FH- group [M = 34.25 (4.41)] had higher sociability scores than the FH+ group [M = 
29.02 (6.24)], constituting a large effect size (d = .92). 
Primary Analyses 
 Hypothesis 1.  A hierarchical regression analysis was conducted to assess whether 
sociability would predict two-choice and three-choice discounting independent of family 
history of substance use.  Two-choice delay discounting was significantly predicted by 
sociability [B = -.001 (.001), t(82) = -2.531, p(2-tailed) = .013], with sociability alone 
accounting for 7.1% of the variance in two-choice discounting but not by FH alone 
[F(1,85) = .714, p = .40, R2 = .008]; however, it appeared that there was an additive effect 
with FH.  Placing both sociability [B = -.001 (.001), t(82) = -3.308, p(2-tailed) = .001] 
and FH [B = -.011 (.005), t(82) = -2.242, p(2-tailed) = .028] into the model, resulted in 
12.4% of the variance being accounted for in two-choice discounting, and this overall 
model was significant [F(2,85) = 5.87, p = .004].  The results from this sample indicate 
that sociability alone is a significant predictor, but that FH history also becomes a 
significant predictor in the context of sociability.  That is, with the additional knowledge 
of a group’s FH, a better prediction of their two-choice discounting behavior can be 
made.  Therefore, the overall model predicts that groups high in sociability and FH+ will 
discount delayed rewards at a significantly lower rate than the low sociability group, FH- 
group.  The beta weight for the interaction between sociability and FH with two-choice 
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discounting was not significant [B = -.0001 (.001), t(82) = .489, p(2-tailed) = .626].  That 
is, sociability did not affect delay discounting (two-choice) differently across differing 
levels of FH.  On the other hand, three-choice delay discounting was not significantly 
predicted by either sociability [B = -.001 (.001), t(82) = -.535, p(2-tailed) = .594] or FH 
[B = -.009 (.008), t(82) = -1.145, p(2-tailed) = .256].  The interaction between sociability 
and FH with three-choice discounting was also not significant [B = .0001 (.001), t(82) = -
.313, p(2-tailed) = .755].  The overall model was not significant, F(3,85) = .873, p = .459, 
accounting for only 3.1% of the variability in the three-choice discounting. 
 In addition, correlation coefficients from both regression analyses were 
transformed using Fisher’s r-to-z transformation.  Null hypothesis testing for the 
difference between the two correlations revealed that there was no significant difference 
between two-choice and three-choice discounting over sociability (z = -1.127, p > .05), 
FH (z = -.747, p > .05), or the interaction of sociability and FH (z = .541, p > .05).  The 
results indicate that Hypothesis 1 was supported in that delay discounting scores showed 
significant differences between high and low sociability groups independent of FH, with 
high sociability groups discounting at a lower rate. 
 Hypothesis 2.  A paired-samples t-test was conducted to assess whether increasing 
cognitive burden would result in significantly higher discounting rates in all participants, 
regardless of sociability or FH.  The one-tailed analysis revealed that the cognitive 
burden significantly increased discounting rates [t(194) = -1.853, p = .033];  however, the 
mean difference was small (Mdiff  = -.00297, SDdiff = .02237, d = .13).  The results indicate 
that Hypothesis 2 was supported in that increased cognitive burden was associated with 
significantly higher discounting rates. 
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 Hypothesis 3.  A 2 x 2 (Sociability x Delay Discounting) repeated measures 
ANOVA was performed to assess whether the low sociability group would increase their 
discounting rate significantly more compared to the high sociability group by increasing 
cognitive burden.  The analyses revealed that the two groups failed to show an increase in 
discounting rates with the added cognitive burden [F(1,184) = 1.599, p(2-tailed) = .208] 
and did not significantly differentiate with the added cognitive load [F(1,184) = .270, 
p(2-tailed) = .604].  However, a test of between-subjects effects indicated that high 
sociability participants discounted delayed rewards (two-choice) at a much lower rate 
than low sociability participants [t(184) = 2.159, p(2-tailed) = .032]; however, the 
difference in means was moderate to small (Mdiff = .00964, d = .35).  The results indicate 
that Hypothesis 3 was not supported in that the low sociability group’s discounting rates 
did not significantly increase more compared to high sociability discounting rates. 
Because of interest in replicating the data of Collins et al. (2005), analyses were 
then conducted in order to categorize the participants into four groups (FH-/High So, FH-
/Low So, FH+/High So, and FH+/Low So).  Individuals were considered to be High So if 
their score was greater than or equal to 30 on the CPI-So scale and considered Low So if 
their score was less than 29.5 on the same scale, as recommended by Gough (1994).  
Please refer to Table 2 for means and standard deviations for each group with regard to 
age, and frequencies of gender and ethnicity.  Independent samples t-tests and Chi-square 
analyses indicated no significant mean differences between the four groups on measures 
of age, gender, or ethnicity (all p’s > .05).   
An ANOVA was not conducted due to the lack of power necessary to see an 
effect (FH-/Low So group n = 5).  Consequently, four independent samples t-tests were 
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performed in order to determine the differences between the four groups.  Mean delay 
discounting parameters (k) for both two-choice and three-choice measures are shown in 
Figures 1 and 3, however, analyses were only carried out on the two-choice measure in 
an effort to limit alpha inflation.  The analyses revealed that the FH-/High So group 
discounted delayed rewards at a significantly higher rate than FH+/High So group [t(45) 
= -2.208, p(2-tailed) = .032], with a moderate difference between means (Mdiff  = .00951, 
d = .47).  Furthermore, the FH+/Low So group also discounted at a significantly higher 
rate than the FH+/High So group [t(26) = 3.065, p(2-tailed) = .005], with a large 
difference between means (Mdiff  = .01557, d = .94).  Finally, there was not a significant 
difference in discounting between the FH-/High So group and the FH+/Low So group 
[t(55) = .966, p(2-tailed) = .338] or between the FH-/Low So group and the FH+/High So 
group [t(4) = 1.916, p(2-tailed) = .125].  Figures 2 and 4 provide a graphical 
representation of the discounting rate for the four groups.  Using k as a constant, the 
indifference point was computed across time as a function of value of the immediate 
choice represented as a percentage of the delay. 
Alcohol Problems and the Four Groups.  Analyses comparing the four groups 
(i.e., FH-/High So, FH-/Low So, FH+/High So, and FH+/Low So) on the B-YAACQ 
measure indicated that the FH-/Low So group [M = 14.0 (6.1)] had significantly more 
drinking problems (p < .01) compared to all other groups [FH-/High So (M = 4.3), 
FH+/Low So (M = 5.7), FH+/High So (M = 4.25)].  No other significant differences were 
found between the four groups.  It should be noted again, however, that their were only 
five participants in the FH-/Low So group.  All inferences made on behalf of this group 
should be made cautiously.    
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CHAPTER VI 
DISCUSSION 
The purpose of the present study was to investigate the relationship between 
sociability, family history of substance abuse, increased cognitive load and delay 
discounting.  Further, the study sought to examine and replicate some of the general 
findings of Collins et al. (2005) study with a less selective sample. 
First, the association between family history of substance abuse, sociability and 
delay discounting was examined.  Specifically, it was predicted that high and low 
sociability groups would show significant differences in discounting delayed rewards 
independent of FH, similar to Collins et al. (2005).  The analyses revealed that this 
hypothesis was supported in the two-choice delay discounting condition but not in the 
three-choice condition.  These results are similar to the Collins et al. (2005) study that 
only used a two-choice condition.  Specifically, those who were high in sociability 
discounted delayed rewards at a slower rate compared to those who were low in 
sociability.  It is also important to note that there appears to be an additive effect, 
whereby sociability together with FH contributed to a significant portion of the variance 
of two-choice delay discounting, more so than sociability alone.  The overall model 
predicts that groups high in sociability and FH+ will discount delayed rewards at a 
significantly lower rate than the low sociability group, FH- group.   However, similar to 
Collins et al. (2005), FH alone was not a significant predictor of two-choice discounting. 
Possible reasons why having a family history of a substance use disorder is beneficial, 
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with regard to discounting, is uncertain at this time.  It would be necessary for future 
studies to also see this relationship before adequate hypotheses could be made.  
Additional analyses revealed that the current sample reported much lower 
problems associated with drinking than previous college based samples.  This finding 
may be a result of participants attempting to present themselves in an unrealistically 
positive manner, or it may also be the result of Oklahoma State University being a “dry” 
campus and, therefore, not allowing students access to high quantities of alcohol.   Still, 
differences were found between low and high sociability groups in regard to reported 
drinking problems.  The low sociability group had significantly more drinking problems 
than the high sociability group.  However, no significant differences were found between 
the two FH groups and drinking problems.  These results lend even more support for 
previous study’s suggestions (i.e., Collins et al., 2005; Werner, 1986) that sociability may 
be more strongly associated with future substance use problems than is FH.   
Also, analyses revealed a significant positive correlation between discounting and 
current drinking behaviors and a negative correlation between sociability and discounting 
and between sociability and current drinking behavior.  Thus, low sociability and 
impulsivity, as measured by a delay discounting task, may possibly be a risk factor for 
substance abuse.  However, it still remains unclear whether substance use is caused by 
these two factors, or if these two factors are caused by increased substance use.  In order 
to help clarify this question, it will be important for future studies to conduct prospective 
research in this area. 
In the three-choice condition, it appears that an increase of cognitive burden 
resulted in both the high and low sociability groups discounting in a similar fashion.  One 
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possible explanation for this lack of differentiation may be that, with an increase in 
cognitive burden, high and low sociability groups are similar in how they discount 
delayed rewards.  However, it is more likely that the three-choice task that we employed 
for this study was not sensitive enough to capture the differences between the low and 
high sociability groups.  In future research, it may be beneficial to investigate the effects 
of increased cognitive burden through the use of a longer and more sensitive three-choice 
delay discounting questionnaire.  The questionnaire in the present study was only 27 
items and did not differentiate between the participants choosing the first delayed reward 
or the second delayed reward over the immediate reward. 
 Second, it was investigated whether an increased cognitive burden through the use 
of a cognitive load would affect an individual’s discounting rate regardless of FH or 
sociability status.  Previous research conducted by Hinson et al. (2003) demonstrated that 
by systematically increasing cognitive burden, researchers were able to directly increase 
discounting rates.  This finding was supported in the present study.  However, the effect 
sizes were quite small compared to those seen in Hinson et al. (2003).  Possible reasons 
for the difference between the results of this study and the previous research is that we 
used a 27-item, paper-and-pencil measure of delay discounting, while Hinson et al. 
(2003) used an 80-item, computer based measure of discounting.  Again, as may be the 
case with the first hypothesis, Hinson et al.’s (2003) discounting measure may have been 
more sensitive to discriminating between the participant’s discounting scores.  Future 
research should investigate the three-choice task utilizing the 27-item, paper-and-pencil 
measure and Hinson et al.’s (2003) 80-item, computer-based task on the same sample in 
order to determine whether one task is more sensitive than the other.   
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Third, we examined whether individuals who differ with regard to level of 
sociability were differentially affected by increased cognitive burden.  It was predicted 
that low So individual’s discounting rates would increase significantly more when 
compared to high So individual’s discounting rates.  This hypothesis, however, was not 
supported.  Though both groups discounting rates significantly increased with the added 
cognitive burden, analyses revealed that these increases were not differentially affected 
by the cognitive burden.  Hinson et al. (2003) demonstrated that both high and low 
impulsive individuals were similarly affected by cognitive burden on a delay discounting 
task.  This finding and the results of the present study may indicate that when an 
individual encounters a cognitive burden, regardless of sociability or impulsivity level, 
they increase their rate of discounting similarly, resulting in a lack of an interaction 
between the effects of increased cognitive burden and sociability (or impulsivity) level. 
 However, the data also revealed that low So individuals discounted at a 
significantly higher rate than the High So individuals on the two-choice delay discounting 
task.  This replicates the findings of the Collins et al. (2005) study, indicating that low 
sociability may be a risk factor for a more impulsive decision-making style. 
 After grouping participants according to risk for substance use [following the 
method employed by Collins et al. (2005)], the data suggested that FH+ individuals had 
significantly lower sociability scores than did FH- individuals.  This indicates that 
individuals who are FH+ may experience greater difficulty conforming to societal norms.  
Further analyses revealed that FH+/High So discounted delayed rewards at a significantly 
lower rate than both the FH+/Low So group and the FH-/High So group.  This finding is 
similar to that found in previous research, whereby individuals who have/had a father or 
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mother with a substance use disorder, but at the same time are high in sociability seem to 
not be as impulsive or experience as many personal issues with drinking as individuals 
who are lower in sociability.  It will be important for future research to look at other 
characteristics of this group (e.g., religiosity, views on substance use).  It may also be 
beneficial to bring this group in for an interview and ask them questions about their FH 
and their perception of how/why they have been affected or not affected by its presence.  
Finally, analyses indicated that the FH-/Low sociability group had significantly more 
problems with alcohol compared to all other groups.  Though speculation as to the 
characteristics of this group should be made cautiously (because of the small sample 
size), it is notable that this group’s mean indicates that they are endorsing symptoms that 
are consistent with alcohol abuse and dependence.  Kahler et al. (2005) suggests that 
individuals with a score of 15 have an 81% chance of having done something impulsive 
when drinking that they regret and a 49% chance of reporting that drinking has harmed 
the quality of their work or schoolwork.  Further, signs of hazardous use and role 
impairment (e.g., driving while intoxicated) are likely, and there is a 63% chance that 
they would be experiencing trouble limiting their drinking. 
Strengths and Limitations 
 The present study sought to replicate part of the findings in the Collins et al. 
(2005) study.  The results of this study support the previous research in its finding that 
FH+ individuals appear to be lower in sociability than FH- individuals.  It also replicated 
the finding that if an individual is FH+ and also high in sociability, it appears that they 
are less impulsive.  This study, however, further adds to the current research by 
demonstrating that there appears to be an additive relationship between sociability and 
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FH, in predicting two-choice discounting scores, and that high sociability individuals are 
also less likely to take part in negative drinking behaviors.  The Collins et al. (2005) 
study screened out for established substance use problems and other types of 
psychopathology, so this latter relationship was not evident in that study. 
 Several important limitations are acknowledged in the current study.  First, the 
lack of a prospective design limits any causal inferences that can be made.  Although an 
apparent relationship between sociability, delay discounting, and drinking patterns exist, 
inference about causation and direction cannot be reliably made.  Therefore, future 
research may implement a prospective design that would track individuals who fell into 
one of the four categories of FH and sociability but who currently did not engage in 
problematic drinking.  These students could then be followed throughout each year of 
college to reassess drinking behaviors. 
 Second, due to the relatively small sample size of the FH-/Low sociability group 
in the present study, it is possible that there was not enough power to determine a 
significant difference between this group and the other groups.  Though there appears to 
be a very low incidence of this group, future research should include a larger sample to 
increase power and the probability that differences will be detected. 
 Finally, the two-choice and three-choice measures of discounting used in the 
present study are only one approach, of many, to understanding discounting.  Although 
the paper-and-pencil version is much faster and appears to be well correlated with more 
time intensive approaches (Epstein et al., 2003), it is limited in the number of discounting 
parameters with which to differentiate participants (only 9 possible values of k).  It is 
strongly encouraged that future research include two separate measures of delay 
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discounting, with one being the 27-item paper-and-pencil version and the other being 
more time intensive, such as the 80-item measure created by Reynolds et al. (2004).   
Conclusions  
 In summary, the present study is a partial replication of Collins et al. (2005) and 
also an attempt to look at the potential effects of cognitive burden across sociability and 
FH.  Sociability alone but not FH alone predicted two-choice discounting k values; 
however, there was an additive effect, whereby sociability together with FH accounted 
for significantly more variance than sociability alone.  The overall additive model suggest 
that FH is only significant in the context of sociability, and that groups who are high in 
sociability and FH+ discount delayed rewards less than groups who are low in sociability 
and FH-.  Furthermore, no interaction was found between FH and sociability.  
Additionally, increases in discounting rates were associated with increased cognitive 
burden, but this effect only occurred within and not between groups. 
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Table 1.  Correlation matrix of L and F scales, discounting, sociability, family history and 
current drinking practices.  
 
 L scale F scale 
k 
2-choice 
k 
3-choice 
CPI FH BYAACQ 
L scale 1 -.181* -.126 -.108 .300** -.161 -.176* 
F scale -.181* 1 .071 .058 -.173* -.144 .204** 
k 2-choice -.126 .071 1 .746** -.155* -.072 .184* 
k 3-choice -.108 .058 .746** 1 -.122 -.076 .189* 
CPI .300** -.173* -.155* -.122 1 -.435** -.379** 
FH- -.161 -.144 -.072 -.076 .435** 1 .032 
BYAACQ -.176* .204** .184* .189* -.379** .032 1 
Note: *  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).  **  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-
tailed).  L scale = faking good; F scale = faking bad; k 2-choice = 2-choice discounting rate; k 3-choice = 3-
choice discounting rate; CPI = California Psychological Inventory; FH- = no family history of problem 
substance use; BYAACQ = Brief Young Adult Alcohol Consequences Questionnaire. 
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Table 2.  Demographics of the Four Sociability x Family History Groups 
 FH-/Low So FH-/High So FH+/Low So FH+/High So
Men (%) 40 26 19 17 
Women (%) 60 74 81 83 
Age (years) 19.2 (1.3) 20.0 (3.9) 22.7 (6.9) 20.9 (3.8) 
Caucasion (%) 100 86 68 75 
African American (%) 0 0 14 0 
Native American (%) 0 7 18 17 
Other (%) 0 7 0 8 
N 5 35 22 24 
Note: FH-/High So = High Sociability/Negative Family History; FH+/High So = High Sociability/Positive 
Family History; FH-/Low So = Low Sociability/Negative Family History; FH+/Low So = Low 
Sociability/Positive Family History. 
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Figure 1.  Mean k-value for Groups Categorized by Sociability and Family History on a 
Two-choice Delay Discounting Task. 
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Note: FH-/Hi So = High Sociability/Negative Family History; FH+/Hi So = High Sociability/Positive 
Family History; FH-/Low So = Low Sociability/Negative Family History; FH+/Low So = Low 
Sociability/Positive Family History. 
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Figure 2.  Percent Value of the Delayed Choice over Time (Two-choice delay 
discounting) 
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Note: FH-/HiSo = High Sociability/Negative Family History; FH+/HiSo = High Sociability/Positive 
Family History; FH-/LoSo = Low Sociability/Negative Family History; FH+/LoSo = Low 
Sociability/Positive Family History. 
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Figure 3.  Mean k-value for Groups Categorized by Sociability and Family History on a 
Three-choice Delay Discounting Task. 
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 Note: FH-/HiSo = High Sociability/Negative Family History; FH+/HiSo = High Sociability/Positive 
Family History; FH-/LoSo = Low Sociability/Negative Family History; FH+/LoSo = Low 
Sociability/Positive Family History. 
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Figure 4.  Percent Value of the Delayed Choice over Time (Three-choice delay 
discounting) 
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Family History; FH-/LoSo = Low Sociability/Negative Family History; FH+/LoSo = Low 
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